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Abstract 
 Since the beginning of the Cold War, the stability of monarchies in the Middle East has 
had major implications for U.S. influence in the region. Building on Michael Herb’s work, I 
explore whether dynastic institutions create better outcomes in economic development and 
alliance systems, and thus lead to less instability in the state. I conducted this research using an 
alternative approach to Herb’s comparison of case-studies by process-tracing the relationship 
between dynastic institutions and political stability in the case of Oman.  
The findings of this study suggest that the strength of dynastic institutions in the Al Bu 
Said from 1913-2018 regime are instead associated with less political stability. It appears that 
dynastic institutions are not necessarily stabilizing as the previous literature has suggested. 
Instead, the dynastic institutions in Oman inhibited reforms due to the need to accommodate a 
larger number of political elites. I suggest that while dynastic institutions can increase the 
likelihood of a state remaining stable, they can also serve as a trap for the regime once there is 
severe instability. Other dynastic monarchies may experience more stability but they may be less 
suited than non-dynastic monarchies to adapt at the pace that is needed to avert regime collapse 
when an unlikely case of instability does occur.  
Political instability was evident in the earliest years of the first time period I examined, 
which suggests future research needs to be conducted on how the political conditions that exist 
when dynastic institutions are established affect the success of dynastic institutions in the long-
term. 
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Introduction 
In 2011, a wave of uprisings known as the ‘Arab Spring’ put pressure on authoritarian 
leaders across the Middle East to implement reforms and in many cases these uprisings 
threatened the existence of the regime. Three regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia did collapse 
while civil wars have created humanitarian disasters in Syria and Yemen. However, none of the 
eight monarchies in the Middle East experienced regime change or civil war. The Arab Spring 
illustrates the phenomenon of monarchies being the most stable type of authoritarian regime 
during the twentieth century and early twenty-first century.1 Initially, the persistence of 
monarchies in the contemporary world took the scholarly community by surprise and much is 
still unknown about the causes of their survival. In this study, I seek to address the question: Why 
do monarchies persist or collapse? 
The benefits of studying this question are not limited to U.S. foreign policy. Researching 
explanations of monarch persistence contributes to our understanding of regime persistence.2 
Since political science is concerned with how humans distribute and use power in a society, the 
concept of regime is fundamental to the study of political science. And this makes it all the more 
important to understand why some regime types persist while others do not. 
To examine this research question, I start with a review of the current literature 
concerned with monarchy stability. The literature review covers the explanations of economic 
conditions, historical influences, and foreign influences. In the literature gap, I discuss the 
                                                          
1 Mona El-Ghobashy, “Governments and Oppositions,” Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East, 
Boulder, Colorado. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. (2013): 39. 
2 Patrick H. O'Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, Fifth Ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015, 34. 
O’Neil defines regime as “the fundamental rules and norms of politics.” 
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importance of testing Michael Herb’s theory on dynastic institutions increasing political stability 
further. 
In the research design, I discuss my use of the process-tracing and case-study methods to 
test whether or not dynastic institutions affect political stability. I test the hypothesized process 
using the Al Bu Said monarchy in Oman. Oman is a valuable case for testing this process 
because it is a case in which the strength of dynastic institutions and political stability fluctuate. 
This allowed me to examine how changes in the strength of dynastic institutions affected 
political stability over the span of 105 years (1913 to 2018). And few of the previous studies that 
have tested the effects of dynastic institutions on political stability used an in-depth case-study. 
Herb, who created the theory of dynastic institutions, mentions that each of the cases he used 
needed in-depth studies. 
In the third section, I divide the 105 years of Omani history into three periods defined by 
the rules of Taimur bin Faisal, Said bin Taimur, and Qaboos bin Said. I separate the data testing 
each hypothesis according to the period that the data has implications for. The first variable that I 
test is dynastic institutions. Then I test two causal mechanisms that act to connect dynastic 
institutions to political stability, the dependent variable. At the end of the data analysis section, I 
lay out variables that I did not anticipate when designing my methods and approach to the study. 
The next section discusses a process of monarchy persistence based on my findings in 
Oman. All three of the hypotheses I tested were inconsistent with the data presented in this study. 
I adjust the process developed from past research to account for the inconsistences past 
theoretical framework and the political history of Oman, leaving a process for future researchers 
to test. 
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The final two sections are limitations and conclusion. Finally, I describe the limitations of 
this study and provide advice to guide future researchers. The conclusion gives a brief recap of 
the study. 
 
Literature Review 
The literature describes three explanations for monarchy persistence. First, economic 
conditions may, or may not, offer an incentive for the population within a state to tolerate the 
persistence of a monarchy. Second, historical influences may shape the narratives of elites and 
create the present institutions within each monarchy. The final explanation is the effect of 
foreign influences on domestic actors. This last explanation includes the influence of the 
relations with foreign regimes as well as the domestic events in foreign states that can affect the 
attitudes and narratives within a state’s population.  
All of these factors influence the outcome of the dependent variable, political stability, 
which is the frequency and severity of domestic events that threaten a regime. External events 
that directly threaten political stability are omitted in this study. The scope of this study only 
examines foreign variables for the effects that those variables have on the behavior of domestic 
actors when that behavior has implications for regime stability. For the purpose of this study, the 
literature incorporated in this section is primarily focused on contemporary Middle Eastern 
monarchies, though it does incorporate research on monarchies from pre-contemporary times or 
other regions if the concepts are still relevant to contemporary Middle Eastern monarchies. 
Scholars across all three of these themes also bring in other regime types for the purpose of 
comparison to identify the strengths that they have observed as being unique to monarchies. 
After this section covers the three themes, I conclude by discussing the gaps in the literature. 
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Political Economy: 
 The political economy in a monarchy plays a major role in determining whether or not 
the population of a state will remain content with the status quo (meaning the continuity of the 
present regime). In the literature concerned with the stability of monarchies, two themes 
regarding this variable are present. The first theme is the rentier state theory, which is a state in 
which the government funds itself using the revenues from natural resource sales rather than 
having to tax its citizens. The second theme is concerned with the confidence of citizens in 
participating in the economy due to having the belief that their property is secure.  
All of the eight monarchies in the Middle East act as rentier states. In rentier states, the 
government is able to collect enough revenue from the extraction and exportation of natural 
resources to fund government operations, rather than having to collect taxes from the 
population.3 In such states, authoritarian regimes are able to keep a hold on power as a result of 
the government not needing cooperation from its citizens in order to collect tax revenue.4 
Scholars have adopted the term “resource trap” to refer to the persistence of an authoritarian 
regime as a result of the resource revenue that allows a government to fund itself without the 
help of tax payers.5 Jordan is the only monarchy with scarce natural resources, though Jordan is 
still able to act as a rentier state due to the financial assistance that they receive from other 
monarchies as well as Western allies.6 Six of the monarchies in the Middle East, all of which are 
on the Arabian Peninsula, have not only enough revenue from resource rents to fund government 
                                                          
3 Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999): 7. 
4 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 7. 
5 Mary Ann Tétreault, "The Winter of the Arab Spring in the Gulf Monarchies," Globalizations 8, no. 5 (October 
2011): 631. 
6 Sean L. Yom and Mohammad H. Al-Momani, "The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability: 
Jordan in the Post-Cold War Era," Arab Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2008): 51. 
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operations, but also enough money to set up generous welfare programs to satisfy their subjects.7 
On top of funding welfare programs, the abundance of oil revenue allows Middle East monarchs 
to heavily invest in infrastructure and education.8 Many of the authors who conducted post-Arab 
Spring studies observed that the monarchs of the Middle East were able to increase government 
payments to their citizens to create an incentive to be content with the status quo.9 
 The second explanation concerns the population’s sense of security in market activities. 
This theme of economic conditions helps to satisfy the population and improve the monarch’s 
legitimacy, while also being more closely associated with monarchies than republics. Menaldo’s 
findings in a large-N analysis suggests this. In his study, he estimates property security based on 
the amount of currency held against the amount of property that requires the consistent 
enforcement of contractual and property protection laws.10 Menaldo draws from Clague’s 
argument that people are more likely to prefer to hold more currency when property rights are 
less secure.11 In his quantitative analysis on the issue of economic freedom, Menaldo found that 
increased consistency in the enforcement of property rights and contracts were associated more 
closely with monarchies than other types of authoritarian regime.12 This situation allows subjects 
to make contracts and own property with assurance that the government will not violate these 
freedoms and it is associated with better economic outcomes in other areas such as production, 
                                                          
7 Sally Khalifa Isaac, “Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies’ Assistance after the Arab Uprisings,” 
Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 3 (2014): 418. 
8Robert S. Snyder, "The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy," International Affairs 91, no. 5 (September 
2015): 1030. 
9 Mary Ann Tétreault, "The Winter of the Arab Spring in the Gulf Monarchies," 631. 
10 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” Journal of Politics 74, no. 3 (2012): 
720. 
11 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 720. 
12Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 721.  
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which is measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. This, in turn, leads to content 
within the population and gives citizens more to lose if the regime collapses.13  
 
Historical Influence: 
 The second major theme that appears in the literature is the historical events and habits 
that influence the narratives of society and leave behind institutions and a ruler’s legitimacy (or 
lack thereof). This explanation includes the length of the ruling family’s hold on power, length of 
the tenure of each monarch’s predecessor, rules and norms developed within the ruling family, 
and past societal narratives. All of these are institutions, which are historical influences when the 
length of their persistence bolsters their legitimacy. While the first two are institutions within the 
state, the other two are outside of the state since they deal with behavior within the ruling family 
and civil society. However, the latter two are able to influence individuals working within the 
state. 
 Dynastic structures are a major determinant in monarchy survival, according to previous 
scholars. The theoretical framework regarding this variable that most of the recent literature 
builds on was put forward by Michael Herb in 1999.14 At the time of his writing, many of the 
scholars studying monarchies in the Middle East argued that the regimes would not be able to 
modernize without it inevitably leading to collapse due to monarchies being an outdated 
regime.15 Five monarchies in the Middle East did in fact collapse during the second half of the 
20th century but eight defied this trend and now appear to be more stable than the republics of the 
                                                          
13 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 711. 
14 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 21. 
15 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 1. 
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Middle East.16 Herb pointed out that Jordan and Morocco survived despite not having strong 
dynastic structures nor the massive oil wealth of Gulf States. But his hypothesis was not focused 
on the mixed results of non-dynasties. Instead, he pointed to the fact that while non-dynasties 
could survive despite being fragile, strong dynastic structures guarantee the survival of the 
monarchy even when faced with adversity, such as the reign of an incompetent ruler.17 After 
Herb published his theoretical framework in 1999, many scholars have supported the idea that 
the resilience of these monarchies is not a coincidence. Six of these eight monarchies can be 
distinguished from the monarchies that did collapse because of their dynastic structures which 
created rules for power competition within the family (though once again, Herb was reluctant to 
include Oman as a dynasty).  
 One outcome of dynastic monarchies that many scholars see as a major variable aiding a 
monarchy’s survival is the rule of law, which is more evident in dynastic monarchies than other 
non-dynastic monarchies and republics. Herb is the first scholar cited in this study to suggest 
this.18 Okar and Jamal’s qualitative analysis supported Herb’s claim in 2002.19 A quantitative 
study conducted by Menaldo in 2012 also supported Herb’s claim. Menaldo found that 
monarchies were more consistent in their enforcement of the law than Republics.20 And this 
finding overlaps with the previous section on the issue of property rights and enforcement of 
contracts. The economic outcome of market security for each individual is in part derived from 
the rule of law because the rule of law makes a government more likely to enforce property 
rights in a predictable way. Menaldo claims that the rule of law is more closely associated with 
                                                          
16 Robert S. Snyder, "The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy," 1029. Also found in Michael Herb, All in 
the Family, 209. 
17 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 103. 
18 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 47. 
19 Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal, “Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on 
Electoral Law Formation,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 3 (2002): 342. 
20 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 711. 
11 
 
monarchies than with other authoritarian regimes.21 There are several reasons for why the rule of 
law is more closely associated with monarchies. According to Herb, the existence of the rule of 
law in dynastic monarchies can be in part explained by family competition, since the ruler will 
be more inclined to please their subjects with fair treatment to ensure that another family who is 
a potential substitute does not surpass them in popularity.22 
 The rule of law also gives a monarch more options in calming unrest. Kamrava observes 
that monarchies are better structured for creating democratic institutions without giving up their 
power.23 In this case, monarchs are more likely to consistently uphold the rules of the electoral 
process when they do make democratic reforms because they can afford to allow an opposition 
group to control parliament since the monarch is not an elected official and can also reserve their 
power to override or dissolve the parliament (so they still reserve the right to violate the 
principles of democracy if they do end up in a desperate situation).24 Okar and Jamal back up the 
findings of Kamrava and also observe that the rule of law gives monarchs an option to calm 
unrest by implementing liberal reforms during times of economic turmoil.25 This happened in 
both Jordan and Morocco, both of which are states that do not enjoy the very high degree of oil 
wealth that the Gulf States enjoy and have made democratic reforms in response to 
dissatisfaction with economic conditions.26 This finding also helps to explain the persistence of 
regimes which Herb claims to be fragile, since both Jordan and Morocco lack the features of a 
dynasty.  
                                                          
21 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 710. 
22 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 62. 
23 Mehran Kamrava, “Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East: A Structural 
Analysis,” Third World Quarterly19, no. 1 (March 1998): 66. 
24 Mehran Kamrava, “Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East,” 68. 
25 Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal, “Rulers and Rules,” 342. 
26 Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal, “Rulers and Rules,” 344. 
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 Finally, a non-institutional factor in historical influence that Abramson and Rivera point 
out is the tenure of past monarchs. While this study was not done on contemporary monarchies, 
they did find that there is a correlation between increased stability under a monarch and longer 
tenure lengths of their predecessor.27 This study relates to the work of Menaldo because it 
supports importance of time in the consolidation of power.28  
 
Foreign Influence: 
 The final explanation for monarchy persistence discussed in the literature is foreign 
influence. This explanation comes in the form of multilateral cooperation, security dilemmas, 
and the events within the domestic arena of foreign states.  
 Monarchies in the Middle East enjoy extra help with regime security from the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). The monarchies of the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, 
provide extra funds and/or extra security forces (as was the case in Bahrain during the Arab 
Spring).29 Empirical evidence that Khalifa uses to support this is the Arab Spring uprising in 
Bahrain, when Saudi forces were sent to aid the regime in a crackdown on protesters.30 Six 
monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates) make up the membership of the GCC.31 As mentioned in the first section, 
the benefits created by the GCC are not limited to its members. Jordan and Morocco, the non-
                                                          
27 Scott Abramson and Carlos Velasco Rivera, “Time is Power: The Noninstitutional Sources of Stability in 
Autocracies.” Journal of Politics 78, no. 4 (2016): 1281. 
28 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 718. 
29 Sally Khalifa Isaac, “Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies,” 418. 
30 Sally Khalifa Isaac, “Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies,” 418. 
31 Sally Khalifa Isaac, “Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies,” 417. 
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GCC monarchies in the Middle East, have also received economic aid from the wealthy states in 
the GCC.32  
There are also relationships outside of the GCC which contribute to the stability of 
monarchies. Core-periphery relationships between the United States and monarchies also 
explains the survival of monarchies. Contrary to the republic rejection of U.S. influence in the 
region, the monarchies of the Middle East tend to welcome U.S. aid and military assets.33 That is 
not to say that the monarchies never face backlash as result of their decisions to develop closer 
ties with the West, but they do not face the same degree of popular pressure to cut ties with the 
West even though there is widespread popular disapproval of Western relations among the 
populations living under the rule of monarchy.34  
For monarchies, having this option allows them to alleviate the problems created by high 
military investment.35 Reduced military expenditures opens up more revenue to be used for 
domestic investment which increases citizen satisfaction.36 For example, in Qatar the 
government has elected to defer military investment and instead allows the U.S. to operate a 
military base within Qatar, with nearly ten thousand soldiers stationed there.37 Savings open up 
state funds to invest in other places. And this core-periphery relationship overlaps with the 
historical narrative of revolutionary nationalism because of the fact that revolutionary nationalist 
                                                          
32 Sean L. Yom and Mohammad H. Al-Momani, "The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability,” 
51. 
33 Fred H. Lawson, “Security Dilemmas in the Contemporary Persian Gulf,” International Politics of the Persian 
Gulf, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 
(2011): 52. 
34 Mohammed Ayoob, “American Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” International Politics of the Persian Gulf, 
Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, (2011): 
138. 
35 Fred H. Lawson, “Security Dilemmas in the Contemporary Persian Gulf,” 57. 
36 Mohammed Ayoob, “American Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” 123. 
37 Mohammed Ayoob, “American Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” 128. 
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narratives are often heavily opposed to Western influence in the region.38 The rejection of 
Western influence by revolutionary nationalists limits the ability for leaders to align with the 
West to increase regime security and so in this case it can be said that the monarchies benefit 
from having a reduced degree of revolutionary nationalism amongst their subjects.39  
 While relations with other states can contribute to the stability of each monarchy, as 
explained above, relations with other states can also create instability. As pointed out by Lawson, 
monarchies in the Middle East are constantly stuck in an arms race with other states in the region 
which is perpetuated by an action-reaction spiral.40 While Iran is an obvious rival for monarchies 
on the Arabian Peninsula, cooperation with GCC states is very conditional and the members of 
the GCC also seek to improve their security against the potential threats that may be posed in the 
future by other GCC members.41 This aspect of foreign influence relates back to the core-
periphery relationship because it explains why monarchs have trouble reducing military spending 
without help from Western powers.  
 Finally, the domestic politics of foreign states can affect a population’s approval of the 
monarch. While many scholars focus on the institutional structures that have contributed to the 
relative stability of monarchies in the Middle East, Snyder proposes that the instability of 
republics can actually explain the stability of monarchies.42 There are many factors that 
contribute to a monarchy’s legitimacy such as distribution of massive oil wealth, which can 
cause monarchs to be perceived as being benevolent dictators by their subjects.43 But Snyder 
points out that the poor outcomes of revolutions within republics is an extra incentive for the 
                                                          
38 Robert S. Snyder, "The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy," 1039. 
39 Robert S. Snyder, "The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy," 1038. 
40 Fred H. Lawson, “Security Dilemmas in the Contemporary Persian Gulf,” 66. 
41 Fred H. Lawson, “Security Dilemmas in the Contemporary Persian Gulf,” 53. 
42 Robert S. Snyder, "The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy," 1040. 
43 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 24. 
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populations within states ruled by a monarch to tolerate the rule of the monarch.44 Adding to 
Snyder’s work on the issue, Isaac points out that this could incentivize monarchs to be selective 
with which authoritarian regimes they back. Isaac uses the monarchies discriminate support for 
other monarchical regimes during domestic instability while supporting oppositions in republics, 
with their support for Syrian opposition being an example.45 
 However, this fear of the aftermath of a revolution can also be attributed to the failures of 
past monarchies that turned into republics that continued authoritarian rule.46 Whether the 
tolerance is reinforced by the collapse of republics or past monarchies, in both cases there seems 
to be no point in a regular citizen risking the things that they already have, especially in wealthy 
oil states, if a successful revolution would make the conditions of the state worse. And in this 
way, the domestic politics of individual states, regardless of regime type, can have a major 
influence on the stability of foreign regimes.  
 
Research Gap: 
 While a lot of research has investigated the question of why some monarchies survive 
and others collapse, more research that looks further in-depth on the cases involved is needed to 
explain the variations not accounted for in the current literature. The case fitting this criteria that 
I use in this study is the Sultanate of Oman. As pointed out by Herb, the Al Bu Said dynasty in 
Oman has dynastic characteristics but he does not classify as a complete dynasty due to the fact 
that the monarch appears to have absolute control, especially after 1939.47 In Oman, the dynastic 
                                                          
44 Robert S. Snyder, "The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy," 1031. 
45 Sally Khalifa Isaac, “Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies,” 424. 
46 Robert S. Snyder, "The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy," 1039. 
47 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 228. 
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institutions present eroded during the reign of Sultan Said bin Taimur.48 And the data used by 
Herb is distributed throughout the 20th century and indicate that stability varies.49 
 
Research Method 
 Based on the research gap discussed in the literature review, I focus on regime stability in 
monarchies as a dependent variable. To clarify, this paper has not abandoned the outcome of 
persistence or collapse but is instead taking a look at political stability as a dependent variable. I 
assume increased stability increases the likelihood of regime persistence while decreased 
stability increases the likelihood of regime collapse. 
 This section discusses how I measure the dependent variable, monarchy stability. It also 
discusses the independent variables, which are dynastic institutions, economic development, and 
ties with a Western state. Finally, I turn to the research approach in which I discuss the method I 
used and the case that I selected to test these variables in. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable for this study is political stability. I measured political stability 
using the presence of open rebellions, coup attempts, clashes with the security forces of other 
states, and reports of widespread protests. These measurements are alterations of the 
measurements used by Menaldo to measure political stability. Menaldo used quantitative 
measurements for violence, demonstrations, casualties, and attempt to overthrow or murder the 
                                                          
48 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 258. 
49 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 258. 
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leader in power.50 Since this is a case-study instead of a large-N comparative analysis, these 
measurements are qualitative rather than quantitative. 
 
Independent Variables 
 In this study, I tested three variables: the erosion of dynastic institutions, close ties with a 
Western state, and economic development. I discuss the measurements used for each variable. 
After I define the measurements used for each variable, I discuss the hypotheses for the 
independent variables and their relationship with the dependent variable. 
The first variable, dynastic institutions, are rules and norms that allow the monarch’s 
family members to have leverage over the monarch and a role in government. My definition is 
consistent with the one used by Michael Herb.51 I measure this variable using the number of the 
monarch’s family members playing an active role in governance (both local and central 
government positions), incidents of ruling family members opposing the policies supported by or 
opinions expressed by the monarch without evidence of the family member concerned being 
reprimanded, and the proportion of government revenue being distributed to members of the 
ruling family (excluding the monarch from this total). All of these measurements give us an idea 
of how much power the members of the ruling family share with the monarch. It is especially 
important to pay attention to the second measurement because the inability of the monarch’s 
family members to express disagreement without losing their government posts and/or incomes 
would suggest that these assets are not translating into leverage over the monarch for the ruling 
family. 
                                                          
50 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 709. 
51 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 14. 
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 The second variable is economic development which I measure using life expectancy, 
infant mortality rate, GNP per capita, number of educational institutions, etc. These 
measurements are indicators of economic and human development and are the same 
measurements used by Menaldo52 and Herb53 as indicators of a state’s economic and human 
development. While I am not using an equation to calculate these statistics into one 
measurement, I compare these statistics to each other to see if there are patterns that hold across 
the majority of these measurements. 
The third variable is close alignment with Western states. Mohammed Ayoob’s work is 
the source of this variable.54 For this study, I include both military and administrative aid, which 
are measurements used by Ayoob when he examines how Western states contribute to the 
security of monarchical regimes in the Gulf Region.55 I exclude economic ties in the form of 
trade as meeting the definition of this variable on its own. To be a close alignment, the two states 
concerned need to exchange arms through an economic transaction for trade to count.  
However, I also measure close alignment in terms of a direct military presence or if the 
regime delegates administrative or diplomatic responsibilities to a foreign government. Ayoob 
includes the former as an indicator56 while the latter is drawn from Herb’s observation of British 
interference in the governance of Gulf States.57 For the latter two measurements, the regime has 
to consent to the West’s presence or assumption of responsibility without any pressure from that 
Western State being evident. 
 
                                                          
52 Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” 709. 
53 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 39. 
54 Mohammed Ayoob, “American Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” 127. 
55 Mohammed Ayoob, “American Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” 128. 
56 Mohammed Ayoob, “American Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” 128. 
57 Michael Herb, All in the Family, 262. 
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Hypotheses 
 The following three hypotheses predict different steps in the process of monarchy 
stability. Hypothesis one makes a prediction about the initial input in the process of monarchy 
stability. Both hypothesis two and three are concerned with causal mechanisms connecting the 
hypothesis one variable, dynastic institutions, to the outcome of monarchy stability.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of dynastic institutions will increase political stability. 
This hypothesis is consistent with Herb’s finings that dynastic institutions are associated 
with increased political stability.58 I predict that the presence of dynastic institutions is the initial 
input in the process of monarchy persistence because of Michael Herb’s evidence showing that 
all six of the monarchies that he defines as dynasties survive and finds this to be a better 
indicator of monarchy stability and persistence than other independent variables.59 If his findings 
apply to all monarchies, then dynastic institutions should be the overall cause that shapes the 
outcome and effect of other independent variables. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Economic development will serve as a causal mechanism connecting the variable 
of dynastic institutions to an increase in monarchy stability. 
This hypothesis is based on a common theme which shows that there is more popular 
tolerance within the populations ruled by the monarchs of the Middle East when oil revenues 
better the living conditions of the population. The article used in my research that discussed this 
the most was be Isaac Sally Khalifa.60 I expect to see the dynastic institutions affect the regime’s 
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decision on whether or not to promote development and/or the regime’s approach in promoting 
development. I expect to see the policies affected by dynastic institutions to have a positive 
outcome in preventing dissent within the population. 
  
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a close alliance with a Western ally will serve as a causal 
mechanism connecting the variable of dynastic institutions to an increase in monarchy stability. 
This hypothesis is drawn from Ayoob’s observation of western allies, particularly the 
United States, play a major role in maintaining political stability in Middle Eastern 
Monarchies.61 I predict that western alliances will serve as a causal mechanism that connects the 
dynastic institutions to political stability. There are two things that will be evident if this 
hypothesis is true. First, the presence of dynastic institutions should restrict the ability of the 
monarch to distance the regime from western powers. Second, the presence of strong Western 
alliances should increase political stability. If dynastic institutions do not restrict the monarch 
from distancing the regime from Western powers but Western alliances do increase political 
stability, then it would be an intervening variable. 
 
Research Approach 
 This study will be conducted using the single-case method. The reason for why this is 
appropriate for the research question asked in this study is because most of the literature 
discussing monarchy persistence and stability, especially in the literature discussing hypothesis 
one, examines variables affecting monarchy persistence across states, looking at trends in 
monarchical regimes. A very small number do an in-depth analysis of individual cases to 
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examine how these independent variables fit into the process of monarchy persistence. Herb 
recommended that other researchers do more in-depth case-studies of the cases he used, since the 
scope of his study made him have to simplify a lot of the case’s historical complexity. 
Conducting an in-depth study on one of the cases used by Herb helps us understand what the 
process of dynastic institutions affecting political stability looks like. 
To conduct this case-study, I used the process-tracing method. I used this method since 
there is already an idea of what the potential causes are of the outcome regime persistence. 
Conducting this study using process-tracing to test known causes and outcomes is in accordance 
with the guidelines set by Beach and Pederson.62 A qualitative study of a case which has the 
input of dynastic structures with erosion being present in the process of regime persistence can 
help in testing past theories using a different approach. This will either affirm or critique the 
current understanding of which independent variables are linked to the dependent variable, 
regime stability, which ultimately ensures regime persistence. 
 
Case Justification 
 I conducted this study using the case of Oman. This is a strong case for testing dynastic 
institutions because the strength of Oman’s dynastic institutions allow us to observe how the 
strengthening and weakening of those institutions affect political stability. In his work in 1999, 
Michael Herb examined thirteen different cases of contemporary monarchies to test his 
hypothesis that dynastic monarchism explains the persistence of many monarchies today.63 
Oman was a case which he had difficulty defining and he ultimately categorizes it as being 
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mostly a dynasty, even though he acknowledges that any control that family members have had 
since 1939 has been entirely dependent upon the grace of the Sultan.64 By categorizing Oman 
with the dynasties, he contradicts his claim in the introduction that a fundamental characteristic 
of a dynasty is that family members possess power that the monarch cannot simply take away 
from them, that the family must act as “a ruling institution.”65 Classifying Oman as a dynasty in 
general and only measuring whether or not it survived completely overlooks how the fluctuation 
of dynastic institutions in Oman interact with the fluctuations in political stability. And Herb 
himself acknowledged that his own study overlooked the complexities of each case he used, 
including Oman.66  
 
Data Collection 
 Accessing data on Oman for the 1913 to 1932 and 1932 to 1970 periods was difficult due 
to both the lack of data available in English. However, I was able to collect enough to get a sense 
of what the dynastic institutions and political stability during these looked like. To collect data 
relevant to the hypotheses tested, I used news articles, the Omani government’s documents and 
databases, the United States government’s databases, and the entire collection of books about 
Omani history in the Alcuin library. Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent 
Foreign Policy by Joseph A. Kechichian provided a large number of primary documents and 
statistics which are cited in this study. 
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The Making of Omani Politics 
 Although this study focuses on Oman from 1913 to 2018, it is important to understand 
the historical origins of the Omani political system that existed in 1913. In this section, I provide 
a brief history of the Al Bu Said family and historical trends of Omani politics to put the data 
collected into context. This section covers the amount of political power held by Al Bu Said 
family prior to 1913, the Al Bu Said’s historical connections to regime enemies, the role of 
geography in shaping Arabian politics, and the role of Great Britain in Oman and the Persian 
Gulf. 
 In the year 1913, Oman had a complex political system with a powerful entity, the 
Imamate of Oman, complicating the Al Bu Said’s ability to consolidate their power.67 The 
Imamate was led by an elected Imam and oscillated between recognizing authority of the Sultan 
and rebelling against the Sultan.68 
 The Al Bu Said regime derives legitimacy was established through the old Imamate, 
sharing an origin with the Imamate. The first sultan from the family was an Imam elected by 
Omani tribal leaders.69 Tribes had selected an Imam to serve as a centralized authority in the 
areas that make up modern day Oman since the year 750 C.E.70 
 With the rise of the second Imamate, two distinct political entities existed in Oman which 
both claimed to rule the same land when they were at odds. At other times, the Imam recognized 
the Sultan but retained a significant amount of autonomy that made it difficult for the Sultan to 
coerce the people of the Imamate. 
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 The Al Bu Said’s power was in decline leading up until the year 1913. During the 19th 
century, the Al Bu Said family had sovereignty over much of the territory that makes up the 
current state of Oman. But Oman used to expand beyond its current territory to include the 
Trucial Coast territories, which makes up the United Arab Emirates today, as well as Zanzibar, 
which is currently a part of Tanzania.71 Zanzibar broke away from Oman after it was given to a 
son who was not the Sultan of the mainland while territory in the Trucial Coast region was lost 
as a result in the decline of the Al Bu Said’s administrative capacity.72  
 It is also important to understand that geography has largely shaped the political 
organization of Arabia throughout history. Arabia has never been unified by a single political 
entity.73 Historically, the terrain of Arabia has made travel difficult and, in turn, makes it easier 
for local leaders to resist a political entity that is attempting to bring the entirety of Arabia under 
its control.74 Since Oman is in Arabia and consists of geographical barriers, such as the vast 
desert known as the ‘Empty Quarter,’75 it is important to note the increased importance of 
popular approval for any central authority to exist. Local political entities such as tribes have 
played a large role in Arabian politics and still limit the ways in which a central authority can 
influence their subjects because the consent of tribal leaders is generally necessary.76 This is 
controlled for in comparing this study to the literature that analyzes other monarchs in Arabia 
since geographical barriers are present in those states as well. But it is still a variable to keep in 
mind, especially because it makes technological development more significant since it made the 
different regions of Oman more accessible. 
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 The ubiquitous British influence in the affairs of Gulf Monarchies had not failed to reach 
Oman by the year 1913 and so it is important to contextualize British influence. An objection 
that may be raised to connections between the Al Bu Said’s dynastic institutions and the outcome 
in political stability is that the Al Bu Said did not have sovereignty over Oman. It is true that 
Oman was a protectorate of Britain at the start of the first period observed in this study (1913) 
and it continued to be until the end of the second period (1970).77 For this reason, it is important 
to contextualize Oman’s status as a protectorate in order to avoid objections derived from a false 
interpretation of what a protectorate is. Interference by the British in Omani domestic affairs was 
rare. The only area of politics that they influenced was international affairs and they did so by the 
consent of the Sultan.78 British courts recognized the sovereignty of British protectorates during 
this period.79 In the eyes of the British courts, protectorates are sovereign states that have only 
allowed the British to handle their international affairs in exchange for benefits, especially 
military aid for the regime. Protectorates reserved the right, to exit from such an agreement.80 In 
essence, protectorates were sovereign states entering into an agreement to act in a specified way 
in international affairs to receive military aid in return.81 
 
Data Analysis 
 This section explores each hypothesis and the supporting and contradicting evidence for 
each. Then it discusses the two unanticipated findings from the data collected. Finally, this 
section concludes by applying all of the findings to create a theoretical process of causation that 
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connects the independent variable/input of dynasty erosion to the dependent variable/output of 
regime persistence. It must be emphasized that this theoretical framework is meant to be tested in 
future studies and future research should propose adjustments to this framework according to 
empirical evidence. 
 
Hypothesis One: The presence of dynastic institutions will serve as an initial independent 
variable in a process that increases political stability. 
 The data that is relevant to this hypothesis is presented in three time periods. I first lay 
out the data from the 1913-1932 period, then the 1932-1970 period, and finally the 1970-2018 
period. Each section discusses the data collected on dynastic institutions first and the data on 
political stability second. Each period concludes with a generalization of what we see during the 
period. At the end, I assess the data by comparing the three periods to each other and I identify 
critical events that influence the strength of dynastic institutions and political stability. 
 
1913-1932 
1. Data on Dynastic Institutions 
There is evidence from this time period that indicates the Sultan’s family members held 
formal positions in the government. A four person Council of Ministers was in place during this 
time. Two out of the four people on this Council were family members.82 The family council 
existed throughout the reign of Taimur bin Faisal, which is data that Herb includes in his own 
study.83 It is important that there was a formal institution through which the ruling family 
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members could have a place, at least to give advice to the Sultan. But degree of significance that 
this evidence holds depends upon how much power the Sultan actually delegated to this council. 
There is evidence that suggests that the Ministers on the Council of Ministers would 
receive power independent of the Sultan’s oversight. Sultan Taimur bin Faisal would delegate his 
governing power to the President of the Council of Ministers for prolonged periods away from 
Muscat.84 And the Sultan’s son, Said bin Taimur, held this powerful position from 1929 to 
1932.85 This suggests that family members shared a significant amount of the Sultan’s power. 
The Sultan did not only give his family members positions that were mere formalities during this 
period. He gave them positions where they had the power to make decisions in policy and they 
had some degree of independence in wielding that power. The family possessing power which is 
not subject to the complete oversight of the Sultan is a sign of strong dynastic institutions during 
this period. 
Sultan Taimur bin Faisal’s disinterest in having a great amount of power may undermine 
the assertion that a dynasty was in place during this time. There are reports that he had expressed 
his desire to abdicate the throne before he finally followed through in 1932.86 For many years, 
the British insisted that he remain the Sultan.87 By pressuring a Sultan who no longer cared to 
have power to not abdicate the throne likely empowered the family members of the Sultan. A 
ruler who does not care to remain in power is more likely to be willing to share power with their 
family members since they do not care to hold on to that power. A ruler would also be less afraid 
of family members usurping their position if they do not care for it, which would likely prevent 
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them from being reluctant to delegate power to potential competitors. This could be interpreted 
as evidence that this period was fit to foster dynastic institutions. It could also mean that family 
influence was not a result of institutions but rather an individual’s ad hoc decision to have some 
family members assist him in his duties as a ruler. More evidence is needed to determine how 
this should be interpreted. 
There is also evidence of Sultan Taimur bin Faisal’s family members sharing a large 
portion of state revenue. The monarch’s family members were pulling in 34% of the state’s 
revenue as this period was coming to a close in 1931.88 Data on the portion of state revenue 
going to family members during the earlier years of this period was not found and so there is no 
certainty that this figure is accurate for other times during this period. However, this is still 
significant because it shows that for at least a part of this early period, family members were 
pulling in a significant portion of government revenue. It suggests that the power of ruling family 
members was institutionalized through the distribution of government resources, which reflects a 
characteristic of strong dynastic institutions.  
The ruling family’s share of state revenue is also evidence of family members 
accumulating resources which can be used to assert their influence. Resources can be used to 
undermine the Sultan’s authority through investments in mercenaries and other means of 
contesting the Sultan’s authority. This prevents the Sultan from disregarding the interests of his 
family members, reinforcing dynastic institutions. Even if the Sultan’s family members did not 
use political leverage to extract government revenue, it is still a sign that family members were 
accumulating resources that would allow them to exert influence in Omani politics during this 
period. 
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There is also evidence of British influence supporting dynastic institutions. The British 
appear to generally accept the will of the family in the selection of the Sultan which is evident in 
their acceptance of Said bin Taimur, who the British backed after it was apparent that he had the 
most support within the family.89 This comes after the end of this period but it suggests that the 
British valued the consent of ruling family members in the time leading up to the accession of 
Said bin Taimur. The British acknowledging the family’s role in choosing successors is a sign of 
strong dynastic institutions. 
In addition the British valuing the consent of ruling family members, the end of this time 
period provides a reflection of how members of the Al Bu Said family valued the family’s 
consent in succession. In his Letter of Accession, Sultan Said bin Taimur says: 
“I am writing to inform you that I have in conformity with the order issued by my father 
ascended the throne of the Sultanate today and have intimated to the members of my family the 
decision of my father to succeed him. They have approved of that and have accepted me as Ruler 
of the State.”90 
 
This suggests that the Sultan sees the family’s approval as being important to his legitimacy. It 
does not tell us how many family members approved of his accession nor the conditions on 
which they accepted him. But the fact that he felt it was important to claim that the family 
approved of him implies that family consent is valuable. Since family decision-making in the 
matter of succession is associated with strong dynastic institutions, this is an indicator of strong 
dynastic institutions. 
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The evidence suggests that strong dynastic institutions were present during this period. At 
least a few family members held significant leverage because the family council had four 
members. The amount of power that the Sultan delegated to his family members and the amount 
of wealth that the family members were receiving suggests that the family members who were 
involved in governance held a significant amount of power. Strong dynastic institutions entail the 
presence of family members who serve as more than mere symbols in their government offices 
which is why the amount of power held by family members is important. If this hypothesis is 
true, then there should also be data that indicate a relatively stable political environment in Oman 
during this period. 
 
2. Data on Political Stability 
 This period was marked by several indicators of severe political instability. During this 
period, the greatest threat to regime survival was the Imamate which had established control over 
the interior.91 Several rebellions occurred, though the degree to which they threatened the regime 
varied. The rebellion that posed the greatest threat during this period resulted in a direct attack on 
Muscat. 3,000 rebel combatants were recruited and marched on Muscat against an army of 700 
supporting the Sultan.92 The army supporting the Sultan consisted of the Sultan’s personal guard 
and British soldiers.93 While it is possible that the army supporting the Sultan enjoyed better 
weaponry and training because of British support, the fact that the Imam’s army consisted of four 
times the number of soldiers in the Sultan’s army suggests severe instability.  
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For a long period, the Al Bu Said family did not have sovereignty over a large portion of 
the territory that they claimed to rule. This is evident in the Treaty of Seeb which was signed in 
1920.94 In this treaty, the Al Bu Said conceded most of the Omani territory outside of Muscat.95 
The Al Bu Said had already lost control of the interior of Oman and this treaty served as an 
acknowledgement of the Imam’s control of the interior.96 While the Imam agreed to recognize 
the Sultan, this treaty restricted the Sultan’s ability to perform normal function of a government 
such as the restriction on his ability to impose taxes upon the people of the interior. The inability 
of the Al Bu Said family to maintain its sovereignty over a large portion of the territory it 
claimed coupled with the fact that the internal political entity disrupting their sovereignty posed a 
threat to the rest of the territory that the Al Bu Said family did control, suggests a severe case of 
instability. 
 Tribal affiliations with the Imamate throughout this time period suggests instability. 
Arabia consisted of tribes and clans that retained a great amount of autonomy.97 Even with the 
creation of modern states in Arabia,98 tribes and clans still have a significant role in politics and 
political entities needed co-opt tribal leaders. The evidence suggests that Sultan Taimur bin 
Faisal failed to co-opt the tribes, especially in the interior regions of Oman and heavily relied on 
British troops to maintain their power over the Omani tribes.99 In contrast, the Imam solely relied 
on tribal support.100 Sultan Taimur bin Faisal’s inability to win the loyalty of the tribes indicates 
a threat to the regime.  
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 The data suggests that the 1913 to 1932 was politically unstable. Muscat, the capital, was 
attacked by forces intending to destroy the Al Bu Said regime. Concessions to the Imam in the 
Treaty of Seeb also suggest the Sultan’s inability to rule. Finally, the Sultan was unable to win 
the loyalty of the tribes.  
 
1932 to 1970 
1. Data on Dynastic Institutions 
The new Sultan that took over in 1932, Said bin Taimur, dissolved the four member 
family council within the first year of his reign.101 This is a major indicator of dynasty erosion 
because this was the only formal institution through which the members of the ruling family 
controlled influential government positions that was found during the data collection for this 
study. Even though not all of the seats on this council were controlled by family members, it was 
still a huge blow to the most influential family members. 
Formal institutions that were introduced also detracted from the influence of any family 
members who controlled government posts. Sultan Said bin Taimur replaced the four person 
Council of Ministers with three departments which were unable to act without his approval.102 
This suggests that ruling family members who did hold formal positions did not possess 
meaningful political power since they could not deviate from the preferences of the Sultan. The 
inability of family members to use at least some of their power independently is a characteristic 
of a weak dynasty. 
A low number of family members holding state posts from 1939 to 1970 also suggests 
that the dynasty eroded during this period. Data that Herb managed to access for his study, which 
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I did not find elsewhere, only showed two family members of Sultan Said bin Taimur holding 
government posts, including posts in the military and local government.103 And these family 
members occupy positions within the military rather than occupying central government 
positions.104 
There are also accounts from British officials that have implications in determining the 
strength of the dynasty during this period. In 1939, British officials in Oman said that they 
doubted that the Sultan’s family members retained.105 While this is an opinion shared by officials 
involved with the Omani government and not hard evidence it is still important for validating the 
analysis of dynastic institutions during this time period. From the outside, the evidence that is 
available to us between 1932 and 1939 suggests that the dynastic institutions have eroded. The 
fact that people who were close to the situation at the time drew the same conclusion from their 
observations helps to validate the way this evidence is being interpreted. 
Sultan Said bin Taimur demonstrated on multiple occasions that he could chase out 
family members who displeased him. Most of his family members were exiled throughout his 
reign, including the two family members who had held government posts in 1939.106 While a 
monarch may be able to exile some family members when there are strong dynastic institutions, 
they face more restrictions. Sultan Said bin Taimur did not need to gain support from family 
members to exile a family member and this approval is needed when family members have 
influence in political affairs.107 He exiled a large majority of powerful family and such a 
proportion of the family being exiled would be a very unlikely event under a strong dynasty. It is 
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in the best interest of every family member to ensure that their own power is safe from the 
Sultan’s authority. The Sultan’s move to exile a majority of family members is a threat to the 
power of any family member since every family members that held a government post was 
chased into exile before the period ended. Such a complete ouster of family members suggests 
that dynastic institutions did not exist to give family members a check on who the Sultan chooses 
to reprimand. 
The end of this period is marked by Sultan Qaboos’ accession to the throne on July 23, 
1970. But the new Sultan’s speech four days after his accession illustrates a decline in dynastic 
institutions. In his broadcast to his people, Sultan Qaboos states that “My family and my armed 
forces have vowed their obedience and sincerity.”108 The Sultan mentions his family members in 
his speech. But he frames in terms of submission rather than approval. This word selection 
shows the attitude shift that occurred from 1932 to 1970 when compared to the words selected by 
Said bin Taimur. Sultan Qaboos’ decision to not emphasize the consent of his family members 
indicates that the dynastic institutions that were left in 1970 were far weaker than the ones that 
existed in 1932. 
This period shows a decline in dynastic institutions. Said bin Taimur’s monopolization of 
power is evident in the reduction of family members in state posts, a large number of family 
members being exiled, a decline in revenue being distributed to the Sultan’s family members, 
and Sultan Qaboos’ emphasizing the submission of his family members rather than their 
approval. 
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2. Data on Political Stability 
 Four pieces of evidence illustrate the instability present during this period. First, two 
major civil wars were fought. Second, threats by family members show division within the 
political elites in Oman and a potential for civil war between the Sultan and his family. And 
further conflict within the family is apparent with the Sultan putting his son, Qaboos bin Said al 
Said, under house arrest. Third, there was an assignation attempt on the Sultan in the 1960s. 
Finally, the period concludes in 1970 with a coup that removes the Sultan from power but the 
regime persists since a member of the Al Bu Said family replaced him. At the end of this section, 
this period is compared to the 1913-1932 period.  
 The first civil war was a rebellion led by Imam Ghalib bin ‘Ali from 1954 to 1959 against 
the rule of Said bin Taimur.109 This is an indicator of instability but based on the reported fear of 
political and military elites associated with the Al Bu Said regime and the United Kingdom, it 
did not appear to raise alarm to the extent that the second civil war did.  
The second civil war took place in Dhofar from 1965 to 1975, consuming the last five 
years of this period.110 This period concludes with the war being unresolved and Sultan Said bin 
Taimur’s tenure coming to an end in 1970. Up until this time, the Dhofar War had been drawn 
out, since the insurgents benefitted from the mountainous terrain in the region and used guerilla 
warfare to holdout against the regime.111 Not only does this fall under instability because it was 
an internal conflict and the Sultan did not have sovereignty over the whole of Oman, the fact that 
it never resolved before the end of Sultan Said’s tenure ended would suggest that without the 
transition of power to a new leader was necessary to turn the war around.  
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The severity of the Dhofar War separates the instability during this period from the 
instability during the 1913-1932 period. During the insurgency, the United Kingdom attempted 
to keep their role in the Dhofar War a secret. Evidence of this is found in the fact that when a 
record was published by the United Kingdom government during the 1964-1970 period, the 
Vietnam War was mentioned 250 times and the Dhofar War in Oman was never mentioned.112 
This is despite the fact that leaders in the West saw the Dhofar as being a critical fight in the 
Cold War to prevent other Arabian monarchies from falling to communist revolutions.113 
There is evidence that suggests that the leaders of the United Kingdom remained silent on 
the war in Dhofar because they were concerned that it would be seen as a failure of the U.K. 
government. The Guardian interviewed a British and Omani commanders involved in Dhofar. 
When asked why the United Kingdom was not open about their role in the Dhofar War, John 
Akehurst, the commander of the Sultan’s Armed Forces in 1972, said “They were perhaps 
nervous that we were going to lose it.”114 Since the insurgents intended to “liberate” all of 
Oman,115 an Omani commander reporting fear amongst the allies of the regime suggests a near 
collapse of the regime. The severity of the situation is illustrated by reports of insurgent control 
in many areas outside of the Dhofar region and influence in areas not under their control.116 
 Threats made by family members towards Sultan Said bin Taimur also suggest instability 
during this period. In 1958, the Sultan’s brother threatened that he would work to overthrow his 
brother from Iraq.117  
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An event that further demonstrates hostilities within the family is Sultan Said bin Taimur 
putting his son, Qaboos bin Said al Said under house arrest in 1964.118 This is evidence of 
tensions within the elite circle. And this division within the elite circle serves as a sign of 
instability. 
Severe instability is also evident in attempts made on the Sultan’s life during this period. 
Assassination attempts on Sultan Said bin Taimur occurred during the 1960s, including an 
attempt made by two of his own military personnel in 1967.119  
This period concludes with a palace coup where Qaboos bin Said al Said overthrew his 
father and assumed power as the new Sultan on July 23, 1970.120 A coup is sign of instability 
since it is a change in government against the former sovereign’s will. But the same regime 
remained in place after this coup since power was transferred from one ruling family member to 
another.  
 
1970-2018 
1. Data on Dynastic Institutions 
The strength of the Al Bu Said regime’s dynastic institutions increased after the transition 
of power from Said bin Taimur to his son Qaboos bin Said al Said on July 23, 1970. Qaboos did 
recall a few of his uncles from exile and even gave some of them government posts.121 However, 
a monarch making the decision to give family members government positions alone does not 
mean that a monarchy is fully dynastic. Sultan Qaboos still had full control over the appointment 
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for government posts and had the authority to remove family members who he did appoint at 
will.  
Qaboos’ absolute power, despite family members occupying a very few government 
posts throughout this period, is evident in who he appointed to those posts. After taking power in 
1970, he recalled one of his uncles, Sayyid Tariq, out of exile and allowed him to become the 
second most influential individual in the government.122 He selected this particular uncle because 
of ideological similarities and due to the fact that Sayyid Tariq had gained a lot of popularity 
among Omani citizens which made him valuable for consolidating power.123 The absence of 
need for the monarch to get support from other family members to appoint or remove 
government office holders suggests that the family power dynamics that are necessary for a 
monarchy to be classified as a dynasty are absent in Oman throughout this period.  
Data on dynastic institutions after Herb wrote his study shows that the dynastic 
institutions that existed at the end of the twentieth was still present in 2017. During this year, 
Sultan Qaboos’ family members occupied seven out of thirty of posts in the Council of 
Ministers.124 The posts that Sultan Qaboos’ family members occupied gave them significant 
influence rather than minor influence.  
Members of the Al Bu Said family also held posts that are implied to be more influential 
than the other posts on the Council of Ministers. Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmoud al-Said holds the 
most influential post in the Council of Ministers with his official title being “Deputy Prime 
Minister for the Council of Ministers.”125 It is difficult to measure the influence of each post 
within the Council of Ministers except through the implications of their titles. The title held by 
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Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmoud al-Said is worded to suggest that it is the head post over the whole 
Council by using “Prime Minister” in the title. Since his title implies that he is responsible for 
managing the operations of the Council of Ministers, it suggests that he has influence over every 
Minister which they do not have over him. This would mean that his post is more influential than 
every other post. And this makes the fact that one Sultan Qaboos’ family members is occupying 
the post even more important. 
 Six other Ministers are related to the Sultan and their positions appear of varying 
importance and also hard to measure. The following is a list of the other six ministers: 
• Minister of Heritage & Culture: Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq al-Said 
• Minister of Diwan of Royal Court: Sayyid Khalid bin Hilal al-Busaidi  
• Minister Responsible For Defence Affairs: Sayyid Badr bin Saud al-Busaidi  
• Minister of Interior: Sayyid Hamoud bin Faisal al-Busaidi  
• Minister of State and Governor of Muscat: Sayyid Saud bin Hilal bin Hamad al-
Busaidi  
• Minister of State and Governor of Dhofar: Sayyid Mohammed bin Sultan bin Hamoud 
al-Busaidi126 
Sultan Qaboos has allowed his family to be much more involved in the state than his father did. 
At the very least the dynastic institutions in the Al Bu Said family have strengthened during this 
period.  
Sultan Qaboos’ control over several significant government posts does limit the ability of 
the ruling family members to act without his oversight. He is still the Sultan (Head of State), 
Prime Minister (Head of Government), Minister of Finance, Minister of Defense, Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs, and Governor of the Central Bank of Oman.127 Having control over these five 
offices gives him a position of oversight over all of the other positions that he gives to his family 
members. Herb points out that this is one way that Oman’s dynasty contrasts other dynasties 
where the monarch typically gives one or more of these positions held by Sultan Qaboos to other 
members which gives them a greater degree of power.128 And the data from 2001 to 2017 shows 
the continuation of this observation which Herb made in 1999, with Qaboos holding these 
powerful posts from year to year.129 This is a major limitation on the ruling family’s influence 
through dynastic institutions. 
 The Sultan also possesses significant leverage to minimize the involvement of his family 
members through his popularity. During the 2011 Arab Spring, Omani citizens criticized the 
government for institutions that they viewed as corrupt. However, there is no evidence of 
criticism of the Sultan, even among anonymous sources.130 Many protestors not only tolerated 
Sultan Qaboos’ performance, they also expressed their faith in the Sultan as the solution to 
corruption within the Omani government. When asked about whether or not they thought Oman 
would follow other states where authoritarian regimes collapsed during the Arab Spring, one 
protester told the BBC "We are not Tunisia, we are not Libya. Our leader is loved, he is not 
corrupt and I would be willing to lay out my life on the line for him."131 A leading protester from 
the Majlis Al-Shura denied that there was any opposition group. "There is no opposition as such, 
and I hate any attempt to describe people who are expressing their demands and their interests as 
opposition."132 This piece of evidence connects to the strength of dynastic institutions since it is a 
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political tool. Sultan Qaboos’ popularity is an indicator of the family having less leverage to 
solidify their role within the regime. An elite who opposes the Sultan’s rule or criticizes the 
Sultan’s policies would risk a reduction in their own legitimacy among the populace since the 
populace is likely to sympathize with the Sultan. It is less necessary for the Sultan to appease 
which is not characteristic of a dynasty. 
However, the absence of criticism is a limited measurement of the Sultan’s popularity 
because of free speech restrictions. The Basic Law, which was implemented in 1996, suggests 
that freedom of speech cannot be used to directly criticize the Sultan:  
His Majesty the Sultan is the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces, his person is inviolable, respect of him is a duty, and his command is obeyed. He is the 
symbol of national unity and the guardian of the preservation and the protection thereof.133 
 
“Respect of him is a duty” implies that verbal criticism of the Sultan is illegal, even though the 
Basic Law does not explicitly prohibit criticism against the Sultan. This likely affects the 
willingness of Omani citizens to criticize the Sultan. But it is unlikely that free speech 
restrictions on their own would be able to deter every protester from speaking out, especially 
with the option of remaining anonymous. Therefore, the lack of anonymous criticisms of the 
Sultan suggests that Sultan Qaboos enjoys high amount of popularity. And the loyalty of Omani 
citizens to Sultan Qaboos serves as a potential limitation on the ruling family’s ability to pressure 
the Sultan which would undermine the dynasty. 
 Criticisms of government institutions with posts held by ruling family members shows a 
disparity in popularity between the Sultan and his family members. During the Arab Spring, 
protesters directed their criticisms at the Majlis al-Shura and the Council of Ministers.134 A large 
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portion of the Ministers in the Omani government are members of the ruling family.135 This 
indicates that more popular criticism is aimed at members of the ruling family rather than Sultan 
Qaboos. The family’s inability to match Sultan Qaboos’ popularity leaves them at a disadvantage 
in any attempt to accumulate more power.  
The absence of provisions in the Basic Law suggest a limit on the ruling family’s ability 
to push for their own legal protection. While the Sultan enjoys legal protection from criticism, 
his family members do not. Criticisms towards ruling family members, even if they are 
Ministers, are not prohibited in the Basic Law.136 While this puts the possibility of the Sultan 
enjoying more genuine popularity in question, it also demonstrates a disparity in power between 
the Sultan and his family members. The ability of the Sultan to implement laws to protect 
himself from criticism while his family members have not managed to do this implies that the 
Sultan’s family members are limited in their ability to pursue provisions that give them legal 
protections. This limitation contradicts the characteristics of a dynasty. 
 The final piece of evidence, which suggests that the dynasty is strengthening, is the legal 
provision that gives the ruling family members the power to choose a successor after the Sultan 
abdicates or is deceased. This is established in Article Six of the Basic Law.137 “The Royal 
Family Council shall, within three days of the throne falling vacant, determine the successor to 
the throne.”138 Sultan Qaboos’ choice to give this power to a family council indicates that the 
family’s approval of the Sultan is valued once again. However, the effects of this provision will 
not become clear until after Sultan Qaboos’ reign comes to an end. For now, Article 6 does not 
constrain Sultan Qaboos or subject him to the approval of his family members. It is a provision 
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that shows that dynastic institutions are starting to be acknowledged as important in the way that 
they were in 1932 but its impact is limited until the reign of Sultan Qaboos comes to an end. 
 Dynastic institutions in the Al Bu Said regime did strengthen during the 1970 to 2018 
period. The evidence presented for this period shows that the Sultan’s family members held 
several important state posts throughout this period, which contrasts the 1932 to 1970 period. 
However, Sultan Qaboos still holds six posts that have given him a final check over the decisions 
made by family members who he appointed to state posts. This contrasts the 1913 to 1932 period 
during which Sultan Taimur bin Faisal delegated his powers as an executive to family members. 
The available evidence suggests that the dynastic institutions of this period were overall stronger 
than the dynastic institutions of the 1932 to 1970 period but weaker than the dynastic institutions 
of the 1913 to 1932 period. However, provisions in the Basic Law that empower the ruling 
family to pick a Sultan offers prospects for the dynastic institutions becoming stronger after 
Sultan Qaboos is deceased and not during his reign. 
 
2. Data on Political Stability 
 Several indicators of political stability are present that were not present to the same 
degree as the 1932 to 1970. There are two events that indicate instability after Sultan Qaboos 
took power.  
First there was the second half of the Dhofar Insurgency which lasted until 1975.139 This 
instability does not begin but does in fact resolve during Qaboos’ reign which contrasts the 
instability that was present at the beginning of the 1913-1932 period. 
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The second event indicating a degree of instability after 1970 is the 2011 Arab Spring 
protests. During this wave of protests, demonstrators called for less government corruption, more 
citizen governance, and more jobs for Omani nationals.140 Two protesters were killed in Sohar as 
some demonstrators did resort to violence in the form of burning law enforcement buildings, 
leading to a crackdown on the protests.141 While this is an example of mild instability, it pales in 
comparison to the instability that is evident prior to 1970.  
  Even violent protesters in Oman‘s Arab Spring advocated for reform rather than regime 
change. No prominent figures within these protests were reported as calling for regime 
change.142 And the quotes from protesters, discussed in the previous section, which expressed 
their love for Sultan Qaboos suggests that this event does not show major instability.  
 The anger expressed by protesters was in large part directed at the Majlis Al-Shura, the 
Omani parliament (a parliament that has no formal power but simply advises the Sultan).143 And 
so this incident of instability is not necessarily a threat to the regime but rather one institution 
within the regime which has no authority, only the power to advise the Sultan.144 Even though 
this qualifies as political instability, it still pales in comparison to the periods examined earlier in 
this section since only two people died as a result,145 far from being an equivalent to the civil 
wars fought during the previous two periods examined in this study. And it was not a threat to 
the Sultan himself and so it does not indicate a severe threat to the regime. 
 
 
                                                          
140 Nicoll Fergus, “Oman: Sultan Qaboos Still Popular Despite Discontent,” BBC World News, March 3, 2011. 
141 “CIA: The World Factbook: Oman.” CIA World Fact Book. 
142 Nicoll Fergus, “Oman.” 
143 Nicoll Fergus, “Oman.” 
144 Nicoll Fergus, “Oman.” 
145 Nicoll Fergus, “Oman.” 
45 
 
Summary Chart 
 1913-1932 1932-1970 1970-2018 
Dynastic Institutions Sultan delegates a 
large amount of 
power to family 
members. Family 
members are more 
influential than in the 
other two periods. 
Dynastic institutions 
are very weak. 
Overall, institutions 
are weaker than they 
are during the other 
two periods. 
Dynastic features 
exist. Offices 
controlled by family 
members lack 
influence. 
Political Stability Consistent instability. 
Regime is heavily 
dependent on British 
support for survival. 
Instability is present 
but not as consistent 
as 1913-1932.  
Instability leftover 
from 1932-1970 
period. Stability is 
consistent after 1975. 
 
 
Significance 
 The evidence presented in this section mostly contradicts the first hypothesis. During the 
1913 to 1932 period, dynastic institutions accompanied frequent instability. From 1932 to 1939, 
the dynastic institutions erode at a quick pace and what remains in 1939 slowly disappears. By 
1970, dynastic institutions hit a low point and Sultan Qaboos bin Said takes power in a coup 
without a family council selecting him to be Sultan. This contrasts the family’s selection of Said 
bin Taimur in 1932. However, this low point of dynastic institutions gives way to Sultan Qaboos 
having more control over policy than he would if dynastic institutions were present. With this 
power, Sultan Qaboos makes a series of radical reforms at the very beginning of his reign. In the 
years immediately following these reforms, the Dhofar War comes to an end and the Al Bu Said 
regime has experienced political stability ever since. This process of political stabilization in 
Oman suggests that the absence of dynastic institutions, not the existence of dynastic institutions, 
was a step in Oman’s political stabilization.  
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Hypothesis Two: Political economic reforms will link the existence of dynastic institutions to an 
increase in political stability. 
 To test this hypothesis, this section lays out the evidence concerned with economic 
conditions for each period. The 1913-1932 and 1932-1970 periods both had limited data on 
economic development indicators that I could access. At the end of this section, I discuss the 
implications of the data in the context of the data regarding dynastic institutions and political 
stability. 
 
1913-1932 
1. Data on Economic Development 
Data on economic development during this time was difficult to find. While some reports 
suggest that economic development was absent during this time, data that can measure 
development in similar measurements to the 1932-1970 and 1970-2018 periods was not 
available.  
There is one indicator that suggests that development was poor, however, which is that 
the government had to tax many of the peasants in Oman by collecting goats and other livestock 
rather than currency.146 This is an indicator that the peasants were living in poor conditions 
because the Al Bu Said family taking a food source instead of currency or less essential goods 
would suggest that the peasants did not have much else to give. Still, this measurement does not 
allow for this period to be compared to other periods. For this reason, I am only going to 
compare the 1932-1970 period and the 1970-2018 period, leaving this one out of the overall 
analysis.  
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1932-1970 
1. Data on Economic Development 
During this period, there are indicators of destitution in Oman. One indicator from this 
period that is available for examination is education. Only three primary schools existing near 
the end of Sultan Said bin Taimur’s tenure.147 The neglect of education, which suggests a neglect 
of human development, is further illustrated by an estimated five percent literacy rate during the 
1960s.148 
 The only indicator of increasing economic development is the sale of oil. It is reported in 
1967 that Oman starts extracting and exporting oil in “commercial quantities.”149 However, Jan 
Morris observes that Sultan Said bin Taimur was receiving payments for oil contracts more than 
ten years before this, in return for allowing oil companies to search the area for oil.150 But it 
appears that little of this was going towards infrastructure or human development, due to the 
reported hike in human development investment immediately following the end of Sultan Said 
bin Taimur’s reign which will be discussed in the 1970-2018 period. 
 As discussed in previous sections, this period is marked by severe instability. The 
presence of instability along with underwhelming economic growth supports the hypothesis that 
a political economy’s poor performance increases instability. This is due to the fact that there is 
low stability and very low economic growth, suggesting a correlation. Both of these variables are 
very similar to the 1913-1932 period. 
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1970-2018 
 This period is marked by rapid and consistent economic development. Development 
during this period far outpaced both of the other two periods examined in this study. Several 
statistics used to measure the living/financial conditions of the Omani population drastically 
improved in the years immediately following Sultan Qaboos’ ascension to the throne. Infant 
mortality rate dropped steadily year by year. In 1970, the year that Sultan Qaboos took office, the 
infant mortality rate was 159 per 1000 births.151 By the next year, 1971, it dropped to around 150 
per 1000 births152 and in the first year after the Dhofar War concluded, 1976, that number 
dropped to around 110.153 And by 1990, it dropped all the way to twenty per one-thousand 
births.154 Since the infant mortality rate continued to fall steadily long after the Dhofar 
Insurgency, it is reasonable to assume that the drop can be attributed to more than just the war 
coming to an end. These statistics suggest an increase in human development  
Improving education statistics also indicate economic development in Oman. The number 
of educational institutions in Oman increased from less than forty in 1971 to around 820 by 
1991.155 To provide a number on the investment in education during the Dhofar Insurgency, the 
number of education institutions surpassed two-hundred as the Dhofar Insurgency was 
concluding.156 Literacy improved to 93% by 2018 along with the increase in educational 
institutions.157 The steady increase in educational institutions is evidence of economic 
development because state revenue has enabled the state to provide these services for its people 
even  
                                                          
151 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, 347. 
152 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, 347. 
153 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, 347. 
154 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, 347. 
155 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, 347. 
156 “CIA: The World Factbook: Oman.” CIA World Fact Book 52 (2018). 
157 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, 348. 
49 
 
Life expectancy also rose consistently from year to year both during and after the Dhofar 
Insurgency. In 1970, life was expected to be very short for Omanis, with the estimate being 
forty-seven years at birth.158 By 1976, life expectancy surpassed fifty years at birth159 and by 
1992 this number had risen to seventy.160 This steady increase in life expectancy is another 
indicator of a growing economy and more investment in human development. And as with the 
other variables, these rising numbers occur before and during an increase in Oman’s domestic 
stability.  
An increase in state capacity is another sign of economic development during this period. 
With more government revenue, Sultan Qaboos was able to increase military investment and this 
action coincided with a perpetuated period of stability after 1975 which indicates that there may 
be a relationship.161 
 
A Cause of Stability 
 Since the data collected to test this hypothesis suggests economic development is 
correlated with political stability, the analysis now turns to whether or not there was a causal 
relationship between these variables. The evidence collected points to the either economic being 
a cause of increased stability or that it is a two-way causal relationship. While the correlation 
was able to be examined with a high number of quantitative measurements, the only 
measurements on causality are qualitative and are limited in number. 
There is the possibility that political stability caused an increase in economic 
development. Sultan Qaboos claimed that political stability is the source of economic growth 
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rather than the relationship being the other way around.162 And this would fit with the claim 
made by Menaldo that stability in monarchical regimes explains successful economic 
development more than other variables, including oil revenue.163 However, the claim made by 
Sultan Qaboos’ is the only piece of evidence that suggests that political stability would be the 
independent variable in this relationship. Furthermore, this claim may not be based on anything 
that Sultan Qaboos knew. He would have a political motive to frame the relationship between 
stability and economic development in this way because it would discourage Omani citizens 
from rising up against the regime if they believe that economic development depended on regime 
survival. There is more evidence that supports economic development being an independent 
variable causing political stability. 
The chronological order of economic development coming first and stability coming 
second suggests that Sultan Qaboos’ claim is incorrect. Oman’s economy started to improve 
during the second half of the Dhofar War (1970-1975) rather than after. It would make more 
sense to believe that the variable that comes first would be the causal variable. If Oman’s 
political stability did not begin to improve until after economic growth started to steadily 
increase, then economic growth must be the input.  
Due to the lack of public opinion polls in Oman, it is difficult to figure out the degree to 
which economic growth makes the citizens of Oman more willing to accept the regime’s 
persistence. However, demands made by protesters during the Arab Spring suggest that lack of 
economic development can spur citizens into action against the regime. In the 2011 Arab Spring, 
the streets of Muscat and Salalah saw large demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction with the 
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government.164 Once the Sultan made the promise of democratic reform and commended the 
demonstrators for voicing their concerns, the demonstrators gradually ended their protests,165 
indicating that the population is willing to create unrest when there is general dissatisfaction with 
economic and living conditions without economic reform in sight. 
 An increase in military spending as a result of rising economic development also suggests 
that economic development promoted stability. Increased military investment allowed Sultan 
Qaboos to end Omani dependence on other states for military aid. Though weaponry was still 
being imported in large quantities,166 the Sultan no longer had to rely on auxiliary forces loyal to 
leaders in other states.167 Moving away from dependence on the United Kingdom helped Sultan 
Qaboos gain popularity since the Omani population generally disapproved of the United 
Kingdom’s influence in Oman and the region at large.168 It also allowed Oman to have security 
without having to make large concessions to other states.169 These points will be discussed 
further in hypothesis three. For right now we can say that increased military investment 
coincided with a perpetuated period of stability after the end of the Dhofar War in 1975.170 This 
would tie increased economic development to increased stability since it is increased economic 
development and government revenue that allows for the increased spending. 
 It appears that political economic reforms have contributed to increased political stability 
in Oman. However, political economic reform does not appear to be a result of strong dynastic 
institutions because these reforms were made in the absence of a dynasty. So political economic 
reforms contributed to increased stability, the only way that it could be linked to the variable of 
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dynastic institutions in Oman is if the absence of the dynasty caused the reforms. This alternative 
is explored further in the discussion and future research sections. 
 
Significance 
 The evidence of economic growth in Oman occurring right before Oman’s domestic 
politics stabilized points to economic development being a part of the process of persistence in 
the Al Bu Said regime. Economic development was a step that occurred right after Qaboos’ rise 
to power and his proposal of major economic reforms.  
Economic development served as a causal mechanism linking Qaboos’ radical agenda to 
an increase political stability. While there are other causal mechanisms that exist, it is apparent 
that economic development had a large role in this process. 
 
 1913-1932 1932-1970 1970-2018 
Development Reported destitution. 
Not enough data to 
know the extent. 
Severe destitution. Large increase in 
economic 
development and 
state services. 
Political Stability Consistent instability. 
Regime is heavily 
dependent on British 
support for survival. 
Instability is present 
but not as consistent 
as 1913-1932.  
Instability leftover 
from 1932-1970 
period. Stability is 
consistent after 1975. 
 
 
Hypothesis Three: Close ties with a Western state will increase political stability.  
 Based on the data collected for this study, Oman having a strong alliance with a Western 
state, the United Kingdom, did not increase political stability. While there were ways that the 
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United Kingdom helped the Al Bu Said regime, the evidence shows that the alliance with the 
U.K. weakened the regime more than it helped.  
 
1913-1932 
 During this time period, the Al Bu Said regime was heavily dependent on the United 
Kingdom for direct military support to uphold their rule. The British played a large role in the 
governance of Oman throughout this period.171 Oman was considered to be a protectorate at this 
time.172 And the British helped them in keeping control of Muscat as well as taking back territory 
outside of Muscat held by powerful Imams.173 
The British respected the Al Bu Said family’s decisions in family power dynamics and in 
the government. An example that illustrates this is Britain’s willingness to accept the family’s 
decision to make Said bin Taimur the new Sultan at the end of this period.174 However, it is 
possible that the British did not interfere because they felt Said bin Taimur was a favorable pick. 
The British were interested in ensuring that the Al Bu Said conducted their foreign affairs 
according to the policies that the British wanted them to adopt.175 Sultan Said did not contest this 
interest and so we do not know if the British would have been willing to intervene in succession 
if their interests were compromised. 
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1932-1970 
During the reign of Sultan Said bin Taimur, the Al Bu Said regime continued to benefit 
from the U.K.’s military support. The U.K. increased direct military support during the first half 
of the Dhofar Insurgency.176 They did not start pulling out of the region until after this period 
ended and Sultan Qaboos came to power.177 This section will first look at evidence of the United 
Kingdom’s actions in Oman and then move to evidence on how this affected political stability.  
The United Kingdom’s role in Omani politics is evident in the historical fact that Oman 
was considered to be a protectorate of the United Kingdom and Sultan Said bin Taimur did not 
contest this.178 
 The Al Bu Said conducted their foreign policy through London in exchange for military 
support. It is apparent that the United Kingdom played a role in Oman’s political stability 
through the fact that they had these agreements with the regime.  
 The Al Bu Said’s ties to the United Kingdom hurt the regime in four ways. Omani 
citizens felt resentment towards the British presence in Oman, since they saw the British as a 
colonizer. The United Kingdom was also confrontational with Oman’s neighbors, including 
Saudi Arabia, which would raise the risk of conflict between Oman and a neighboring state. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom increased resentment held by the population through brutal 
treatment of citizens and insurgents in Dhofar. The last way that the United Kingdom hurt the 
regime was preventing the regime from forming diplomatic ties. Oman had no direct diplomatic 
ties with any states besides the United Kingdom and London preferred for Omani diplomacy to 
go through them.179  
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 There was widespread resentment for the United Kingdom among the general Omani 
population. Rhetoric from external allies of the Dhofar communist insurgents shows that 
rebellions such as this drew support from Omani citizens who saw the regime as a puppet of the 
United Kingdom Mao Zedong states Beijing’s support for the insurgents saying that China 
“sympathized with and supported all struggles against colonialism, and pledged its firm support 
to the heroic Arabs who were fighting against British enslavement and plunder in Oman.”180 
With actors opposed to the regime framing the British as the ultimate enemy of the Omani 
people in this rhetoric, it appears that the United Kingdom hurt the regime through their 
presence. The United Kingdom gave the enemies of the regime their rallying call. 
The manner by which the United Kingdom pursued its interests in Oman went against the 
regime’s stability interests. Pressure from London caused the Sultan to be confrontational with 
neighboring states, though the United Kingdom would often involve its own forces directly as 
well. The various border disputes with Saudi Arabia during the reign of Said bin Taimur is an 
example. These disputes which turned into standoffs with Saudi Arabia threatened stability with 
the potential for war. Saudi Arabia also used proxies within Oman, including Imam Ghalib bin 
‘Ali, to weaken the position of Said bin Taimur.181 Ghalib bin ‘Ali openly rebelled against the 
Sultan from 1954 to 1959,182 which created a threat to the Al Said regime. This was triggered by 
the British pressuring Sultan Said bin Taimur’s to engage in such standoffs to serve the British 
interests of taking control of additional oil reserves.183 
The British commanders used excessive force during the Dhofar War which also appears 
to hurt the regime during this period. The Guardian quotes an unnamed British officer describing 
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their actions in Dhofar, “We burnt down rebel villages and shot their goats and cows. Any enemy 
corpses we recovered were propped up in the Salalah souk as a salutary lesson to any would-be 
freedom fighters.”184 The population already saw the United Kingdom as an oppressive colonial 
power and the Al Bu Said as their puppet.185 And while the British officer quoted saw the use of 
fear as a way of keeping the Omani people in line, the Al Bu Said regime and the British still 
appeared to be entrenched in a losing fight.  
Evidence also shows a disregard for innocent lives within the U.K. government and 
military. One officer interviewed by the Guardian denies the presence of any innocent people in 
the Dhofar region. “The only people in this area – there are no civilians – are all enemy. 
Therefore you can get on with doing the job, mortaring the area and returning small arms fire 
without worrying about hurting innocent people.”186 With multiple officers shamelessly 
advocating against human rights in Dhofar, it appears that the intent of brutal treatment towards 
all individuals in Dhofar was not limited to one officer within the military. Such brutal treatment 
added to the resentment that the people of Dhofar and perhaps the rest of Oman felt towards the 
United Kingdom. 
It is clear that there was resentment towards the United Kingdom in Oman and that 
opposition leaders resented the regime for this relationship. However, something that is not clear 
from the data collected is the degree to which this turned the general Omani population against 
the regime during this time. The assassination attempts against Sultan Said bin Taimur, including 
the attempt made by his own military personnel in 1967 shows that the population resented the 
Sultan. And the evidence presented earlier in this section shows that the population resented the 
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United Kingdom. It would seem logical that resentment towards a regime’s allies and resentment 
towards the regime would be concomitants but I am reluctant to make a claim without evidence 
that shows the degree to which the general population resented the regime for this relationship. 
There are other reasons for why the population could hold resentment towards the regime so it is 
not clear how influential this variable was during this period. 
  
1970-2018 
During this period, the Al Bu Said regime, under the leadership of Sultan Qaboos bin 
Said, distances itself from the United Kingdom. The Al Bu Said regime benefits from this 
distancing of relations in two ways. Managing diplomacy outside of London leads to an increase 
in Oman’s allies and it gives rebels an incentive to defect in favor of the regime. 
Ties with the United Kingdom also hurt the Al Bu Said regime by preventing the 
expansion of Oman’s diplomatic relations. Prior to 1971, Oman had not established formal 
diplomatic relations with any state besides the United Kingdom.187 Sultan Said bin Taimur had 
managed Oman’s foreign affairs entirely through London.188 After Sultan Qaboos started to 
distance Oman from the United Kingdom, the number of states with formal diplomatic relations 
with Oman increased from zero in 1970 to 117 in 1994.189 As a result, other states in the Middle 
East eventually aid the Al Bu Said regime, with Iran being one example.190 This allowed the 
regime to find multiple allies to aid them and those allies were less alienating to the Omani 
people than the United Kingdom. The benefit of more diplomatic relations suggests that the 
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regime’s alliance with the United Kingdom was hurting them by preventing the regime from 
forging alliances with more states. 
There is also evidence that suggests that the brutality used by the United Kingdom in the 
Dhofar region was a strategic error that created more animosity towards the British rather than 
scaring people into submission. The evidence suggesting this is Sultan Qaboos’ alternative 
approach that coincides with dwindling support for the Dhofar insurgents. Sultan Qaboos shows 
mercy to a large number of Dhofari insurgents rather than using brutality. This is illustrated by 
his decision to pardon prisoners of war and groups of insurgents that surrender to the Al Bu 
Said.191 A decline in support for the Dhofar insurgents coincides with these reports of merciful 
treatment that are especially present from 1974-1975.192  This approach appears to have 
produced better results for the Al Bu Said regime in the war than the U.K.’s attempt to instill fear 
in the Dhofari population. 
 The data collected suggests that this hypothesis is not supported in the case of Oman. 
Political stability appears to increase as a result of the Al Bu Said family creating distance 
between themselves and their Western allies. It does appear that the absence of a dynasty makes 
it easier for a monarch to distance the regime from Western allies, but this ended up increasing 
stability. While Oman’s alliance with the United Kingdom provided military assets to strengthen 
the regime’s capacity to coerce, this relationship hurt the Sultan’s legitimacy. And the increased 
resentment towards the regime appears to have exhausted the extra capacity to coerce and turned 
Omani military personnel against the Sultan. 
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Omitted Variables 
 Two variables that were not anticipated in the research design appear to be influencing 
the political stability of Oman and the persistence of the Al Bu Said dynasty. The variables 
discussed in this section are the erosion of the dynasty as a cause of increased stability, gender 
equality, slavery, and treatment of state enemies. After the conclusion of this section, all of the 
findings in the case of Oman will be used in a theoretical framework that lays out the process by 
which the erosion of the dynasty set up other variables (causal mechanisms) to increase political 
stability which ultimately ensures regime persistence. 
 
Erosion as a Necessity: 
 In Oman, the erosion of dynastic institutions not only appeared to not decrease stability, it 
also appears to have been necessary for survival in the case of the Al Bu Said regime. This is due 
to the fact that radical reforms served as causal mechanisms in the process of Sultan Qaboos’ rise 
to power leading to the restoration of stability for the first time in over a century. At the start of 
his tenure, Sultan Qaboos found himself governing a country nearly torn apart by his father. 
Insurgents connected with Yemen held much of Dhofar and the crown was having to wage a war 
within the borders of Oman to pursue reunification. Furthermore, the citizens of Oman were 
facing severe destitution with hardly any investment in infrastructure and human development.  
 The only way in which Sultan Qaboos could see the regime digging itself out of such a 
hole was through radical reforms. He managed to consolidate his power and stabilize Oman 
politically by drastically increasing investment in human development and infrastructure, by 
ending a foreign policy of dependence on the United Kingdom, and by making reforms that 
increased rights and opportunities for women. Such reforms within a few years of taking power 
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would have been next to impossible for Sultan Qaboos to make if he had family members with 
enough influence in decision-making to obstruct his agenda. This can be assumed because these 
reforms contradict the common beliefs in Oman and the Arabian Peninsula as a whole.  
 
Gender Equality: 
 One area of reform that Sultan Qaboos could only achieved due to the erosion of dynastic 
power structures is gender equality. In a first-hand observation, Phillips says “In terms of 
personality, of economics, of politics and of civics, there are no women in Oman; women exist in 
number always greater than men, but their existence is domestic and servile only.”193 And with 
gender issues being mixed into the series of radical reforms made by Sultan Qaboos, it raises 
gender issues as a new variable that may contribute to the persistence of monarchy. 
Theoretically, it would stand to reason that reforms to promote gender equality would give 
women a stake in the survival of the regime promoting those reforms. However, no data was 
found comparing the difference in regime support among men and women. For right now, this 
study does provide evidence that this variable plays a role in determining monarchy persistence. 
The correlation between gender equality reforms and increasing political stability serves as 
support that this is an important variable.  
 
Slavery 
 Another radical reform made by Sultan Qaboos after his ascension to power was the 
abolition of slavery in Oman. He abolished slavery immediately after ascending to the throne.194 
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So not only did Qaboos free Oman from its “enslavement” to the U.K., his move to abolish 
slavery gave the people of Oman another reason to view him as a liberator. People view Sultan 
Qaboos as a benevolent dictator.195 His willingness to free his family’s slaves further reinforces 
his intent to promote the well-being of his people. 
This is in stark contrast to Qaboos’ father who owned around 500 slaves when Qaboos 
overthrew him on July 23, 1970.196 And this gave people another reason to hate Sultan Said bin 
Taimur. Since this abolishment of slavery was one of the reforms that Sultan Qaboos made to 
separate himself from his father, it may play a role as causal mechanism in the process of regime 
persistence in Oman. The legal status of slavery is a variable that should be examined in future 
research on monarchy stability. 
 
Treatment of State Enemies 
 Sultan Qaboos approached enemies to the regime in a radically different way. He was 
skillful in his use of mercy towards enemies who surrendered or were captured.197 And the 
section for hypothesis three discusses how this coincides with a weakening of support during the 
Dhofar War, though the effects of Qaboos’ merciful treatment remain uncertain even though it 
would make sense that more people would be willing to abandon the rebellion if they believed 
that they would be shown mercy if they submitted to the regime. Treatment of regime enemies is 
a variable that should be tested in future research on monarchy stability. 
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The Process of Monarchy Persistence 
 The process of political stability in Oman has implications for how dynastic institutions 
may affect political stability in the other monarchies that still exist today. The results of this 
study suggest that the erosion of the pre-1932 dynastic institutions actually helped increase 
political stability, raising questions about Herb’s findings that dynastic institutions contribute to 
political stability. However, this study highlights a problem other dynastic monarchies may 
encounter after their political system endures a politically destabilizing shock. The following is a 
summary of the process we see in Oman: 
 
 Initially the erosion of the dynasty in 1932 does not increase stability. Consistent 
instability is present during the reign of Said bin Taimur. He was an unpopular leader who did 
not make reforms beyond the expansion of the Sultan’s absolute power and delegating more of 
the Sultan’s governing power to British agents. This produces a similar degree of stability seen 
Dynastic Institutions 
and Instability present
Dynastic institutions 
erode
No change in stability
Sultan Qaboos takes 
power
Major reforms are 
implemented 
Political stabilization
Signs of growing 
dynastic institutions
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during the reign of his predecessors. However, the erosion of the dynasty during the 1932-1970 
period did open the door for a future Sultan  
After his father’s failure to implement stabilizing reforms, Sultan Qaboos did eventually 
capitalize on the reduced restrictions on the Sultan’s ability to make policy reforms. When Sultan 
Qaboos took the throne, he was able to make radical reforms such as the abolition of slavery, 
socio-economic reform, and the expansion of gender equality. These reforms would have been 
hard to implement since they were very controversial.  
Since this is a case-study, the results still need to be tested in other cases in order to 
determine whether or not they can be generalized. If the process of political stability in Oman 
can be generalized, here is what that process should look like in other monarchies: 
 
This is not necessarily what the process of stability looks like in other monarchies. However, it 
can be used to form hypotheses to test in other cases. 
 
 
System shock
Dynasty remains
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Instability remains 
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Dynasty erodes
Monarch opposes 
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and potential 
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Monarch 
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Monarch 
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unrestricted reform
Stability restored
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Conclusion 
 This study examined the process of regime stability in monarchies. It focused on dynastic 
institutions as an initially independent variable, with economic development and alliance 
systems. The results suggest that the presence of dynastic institutions in Oman’s Al Bu Said 
ruling family was accompanied with less political stability. This could mean that the dynastic 
monarchies examined in other scholarly articles may be experiencing more stability but they may 
be less suited than non-dynastic monarchies to adapt at the pace that is needed to avert regime 
collapse when an unlikely case of instability does occur. However, this study is limited by the 
fact that only one case was process traced. Future studies should focus on the timeline 
comparison in other Middle Eastern Monarchies to test the relationship between dynastic 
institutions and political stability. 
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